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Of Envelopes and Legends: Reflections on Tort Law
Frank L. Maraist'
I. INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATION
More than 40 years ago, when as a student I struggled to master the intricacies
of the law, I heard a legend' comment that all of tort law could be written on the
back of an envelope.' As one might suspect, that legend taught contract law.
However, his comment stayed with me, albeit usually in the recesses of the mind,
during my many years of practicing law and many more years of teaching torts.
Because I have always loved tort law and have found it the most intellectually
stimulating field in the profession, I never forgave the legend for the comment.
Later, I would retaliate when, as a faculty colleague of the legend,3 I observed that
all of contract law can be reduced to three questions, and thus fit on the back of a
small envelope. I remain convinced that my observation was correct, and that one
may compress contract law into these questions: Can they agree? Did they agree?
What did they agree to?
After 30 years as a torts teacher, I now see the wisdom of the legend's
comment. While contract law can be reduced to three basic questions, tort law can
be reduced to only one: when harm occurs or is threatened because of a human act,
is it the better societal choice to impose the loss upon the actor, or to let the loss
stay with the victim? This single issue can be subdivided (we are up to two
questions now, approaching parity with contract law): 1) did the actor's conduct
expose others to a risk of harm that society generally condemns (which we may call
the "general risk") and 2) under the particular circumstances of this case, do we
want to impose liability upon this actor for this conduct which caused these
damages to this plaintiff in this particular manner (which we may call the "specific
risk")?
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1. For youngsters and non-members of the Louisiana legal community, the author must explain
that the legend was Dean Mac Hebert, a great teacher, scholar and administrator for nearly half a
century. He served as Dean at Loyola Law School, as Dean of the LSU Law School for 35 years, and
as acting president of LSU, but he is best remembered by his former students as a demanding teacher
of negotiable instruments law (NIL, now, by virtue of legislative fiat, the UCC).
This essay was prepared primarily for my students in tort law. I am grateful to Bill Corbett, John
Church, and John White, my fellow torts teachers at LSU, and to Glenn Morris, who teaches contracts,
for their helpful comments about this essay. I also am grateful to Raley Alford, my research assistant
(and the student editor of this piece), for his excellent assistance.
2. Actually, the author did not hear the comment, but has it on reliable (by law school standards)
hearsay.
3. Of course, this retaliation did not come until the author was a full professor with tenure at
LSU. Contrary to widely held beliefs at the bar, the acquisition of some academic knowledge does not
necessarily mean the total loss of environmental knowledge, a/I/a "street smarts."
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What the legend did not add (although I am certain he realized it) was
that the basic three-question contract law and two-question tort law are made
incredibly complicated (and sometimes incomprehensible) by legislative
alteration and by judicial application in a myriad of fact patterns. Adding
to the difficulties are the frequent commingling of tort law and contract law
in the resolution of controversies and the role of tort law as the "garbage
heap" of private law, i.e., "if it doesn't fit under anything else, can it be
a tort?"
II. STATUTES, CONTRACTS AND TORT LAW
The complications of contract law are beyond this discussion. What I
focus upon here is the way in which the two basic tort law questions (the
"general risk" and the "specific risk" inquiries described above) have been
made difficult to understand and to apply because of statutory and judicial
innovations. I begin with two basic truths: 1) legislation "trumps"
jurisprudence and 2) contract law usually prevails over tort law. Thus, when
the act of one person (the actor) causes harm to another (the victim), the
first inquiry in tort law analysis is whether the legislature has made a determination
of how the loss should be allocated between them. If there is a statute
providing that an actor who does a particular act which causes harm to another must
bear the cost ("you break, you pay"), then tort law is irrelevant. The legislature has
spoken, and, given the "pecking order" of law,4 has resolved the matter. Such
statutes are rare, however.
If there is no damage-allocating statute,5 the next inquiry is whether the parties
(actor and victim) have agreed in advance on how the loss should be borne. In such
a case, lawyers are wont to say that the contract is the law between the parties.6
This, of course, provokes the three questions governing contract law: Can they
agree? Did they agree? What did they agree to? If the parties have not agreed, or
4. Every high school student who has not escaped a civics course knows that legislatures make
law and judges apply it. Lawyers (and, before very long, law students) know that judges make more
law than do legislatures. Judges make law by interpreting and applying statutes to given fact patterns
when the statutory language does not clearly dictate the result. Sometimes judges overzealously find
that the statutory language does not clearly dictate the answer, and, thus, seize the opportunity to make
law through interpretation of an "ambiguous" statute. Judges also make law in the many situations that
arise in which there is no legislative expression on the issue. In such a case, a court with jurisdiction
must either allow the matter to proceed to trial, or dismiss the case at the outset (a demurrer, a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be ganted, or, in Louisiana procedure, an
exception of no cause of action). Whichever way he or she goes, the judge is making substantive law.
5. See, e.g., La. R.S. 23:106(AX3) (1998) (an employment bureau licensee "shall pay all
damages resulting from any unlawful action in its capacity as an employment service"); La. R.S.
46:1956(C) (1999) (person who interferes with or injures an assistance dog "shall pay for actual
damages for any economic loss to any person aggrieved thereby"). A statutory allocation of the loss
may be altered by contract, although such a reallocation by the parties may in some cases be void. See
infra note 7.
6. See, e.g., Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1999).
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if the law does not permit them to agree (because we need a Latin name to keep up
appearances, we say the contract is contra bones mores'), then contract law is
inapplicable and the next level-tort law-is reached.
This does not mean, however, that legislation and contract law disappear from
the tort process. A statute which does not directly impose the loss upon the actor
may do so indirectly through judicial adoption of it as the standard for tort liability."
Contract law also plays a major role in the configuration of tort law. One example
is contractual waiver in advance of any liability for a future act which may cause
harm.9 Such a waiver generally is upheld when the damages are traditional contract
damages (the so called "benefit of the bargain"), ° but often it is rejected as contra
bones mores when the damages are traditional tort damages (personal injury and
property damage). " Conversely, tort law is hesitant to provide recovery of damages
where the underlying tortious conduct also involves a breach of contract.' 2 Tort law
may borrow from contract law, such as in the development of products liability,
where the underlying theory of recovery was first tort (negligence), and then
contract (redhibition, or, in common laws terms, breach of implied warranty) and,
finally, back to tort (strict products liability ). 3 Of course, contract law makes its
most pervasive foray into tort law with insurance contracts that indemnify the actor
against liability arising from the actor's tortious conduct."'
7. A contract that is contra bones mores, meaning "against good morals," is void. See, e.g.,
Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618,620 (La. 1978) (finding a provision of an antenuptial agreement
in which a wife waived her right to temporary alimony in the event ofjudicial separation from bed and
board to be null and void as against public policy).
8. This generally is reflected in the doctrine providing that the violation of a certain criminal
statute is negligence per se, i.e., negligence in and of itself without more. The result is a conversion of
the negligence action into a strict liability or absolute liability action. See, e.g., Meany v. Meany, 639
So. 2d 229 (La. 1994). See also Thoms C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53
La. L Rev. 1509, 1515-21 (1993).
9. Sometimes called "express contractual assumption of the risk,"the classic example is the term
usually printed on a parking lot ticket providing that the customer agrees to relieve the parking lot of
liability for damage to the vehicle.
10. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2548 (parties may agree to exclude warranty); La. Civ. Code art.
2004 (any clause is null that in advance limits the liability of a party for intentional or gross fault).
Thus, a party may limit liability for economic loss caused by another's conduct which is not intentional
or gross fault.
II. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2004, providing in relevant part that "[a]ny clause is null that,
in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing physical injury to the other
party."See also Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811 (La. 1991).
12. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, at 655-67 (5th ed.
1984).
13. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts §§ 352-53, at 969-75 (2000).
14. Insurance is a contract whereby one party (the insurer) agrees to indemnify (repay) the other
(the insured) for damages sustained through the conduct of the insured or a third person. An insured
purchases "first party" insurance to obtain reimbursement from the insurer for damages to his person
or property. Examples of first party insurance include comprehensive and collision automobile
coverage, hospitalization coverage, and fire coverage in a homeowner's policy. More important to tort
law is "third party" or "liability" insurance, where the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured against
his tort liability to third persons. The most obvious example of third party insurance is the liability
coverage provided by an automobile policy. Either type of insurance is a method by which the law
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As noted, if there is no applicable damage-allocating statute or contractual
provision, and the victim seeks to impose the loss upon the actor, traditional tort
law rules apply. Over several hundred years and millions of cases, the
common law has developed an approach to resolving tort claims that focuses
upon the general risk which the actor's conduct created, and the specific risk
which the victim suffered. Not surprisingly, Louisiana law, although
developed from civil law traditions, 5 applies the same "general risk/special risk"
concept.
MI. THE GENERAL RiSKS
The first inquiry in the traditional tort approach is identifying the general type
of risk that may apply-is there a general principle of tort law which condemns the
actor's conduct? If there is, then the other question is whether that general risk
protects against the specific risk that caused the damage, i.e., should this actor be
liable to this victim for these damages occurring in this particular manner? There
are six general risks: 1) was the actor's conduct intentional, 6 2) was the actor's
conduct willful or wanton (sometimes termed reckless or gross negligence)," 3) was
the actor negligent," 4) does the actor's relationship to a person make the actor
liable for the wrongfid conduct of that person (vicarious liability), 9 5) does the
actor's relationship to a thing make the actor liable for the damage-causing
condition of the thing (strict liability),20 and 6) does the actor's participation in an
activity subject him or her to liability for the damages caused by that activity
(absolute liability)?2' When the actor's conduct does not fit within one of these six
general risks, traditional tort law dictates that the loss should stay where it is, i.e.,
with the victim. At this point one may say there is "no tort" or that the
injury-causing event was "an accident," although the latter term is too legally
imprecise to be helpful.
permits a group of persons (those insured by the same insurer against the same risk) to spread their
losses among themselves, thereby reducing the impact of a particular loss upon an individual member.
See Infra note 31.
15. The "fountainhead" of Louisiana tort law is found in one article in the Civil Code: Article
2315. That article provides rather cryptically that "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."A comprehensive body of Louisiana tort
law has been developed by judicial application of that 20-word legislative directive.
16. See Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law 1-15 (1996).
17. Id. The most common general risks, discussed below, are that the victim will be injured by
the intentional conduct or negligence of another. There is another level ofegregious conduct which falls
somewhere between intentional and negligent conduct. While authorities generally agree that there is
only one intermediate level, it may be given any one of several names by a particular jurisdiction,
including "willful," "wanton," "reckless" and "gross negligence."The first thing a law student should
learn is to escape the "tyranny of terminology," i.e., identify the nature of the conduct which the law
proscribes, and not focus solely upon the name which the lawmaker uses.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Each general risk is confined by an operative principle which may be precise
or vague. The intentional torts are generally precise; a specific operative principle
determines whether certain conduct is a battery, or an assault, or a false
imprisonment, or an intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, the
tort of battery occurs when the actor does an act that, to a person of ordinary
sensibilities, is substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive touching.22
Other general risks often have imprecise operative principles which invite more
fact-specific analysis. The classic is negligence-one is negligent if he or she fails
to act as a reasonably prudent person under all of the circumstances." The
application of the definition/operative principle of a general risk to a particular set
of facts may occur often enough, and produce the same result often enough, that a
"rule" of tort law develops.' However, one should never lose sight of the fact that
it is the operative principle, and not the rule, which controls.
Nowhere is the general risk inquiry more fragmented (at least in Louisiana)
than in the negligence sphere. The general risk of negligent conduct is subdivided
into traditional elements of duty, breach and causation.' The duty element
generally asks whether the actor should have taken any care whatsoever for the
safety of others. This turns upon the foreseeability of harm resulting from the
actor's conduct, i.e., could the actor foresee that his or her conduct would expose
others to a risk of harm?' Arguably, that is the end of the duty inquiry, and the
reasonableness of the actor's conduct is considered at the breach level. Some,
however, would add to the duty inquiry a reasonableness factor, i.e., assuming the
actor could foresee that his conduct would expose others to a risk of harm, was that
risk unreasonable in the light of all of the factors (determined for the most part by
balancing the likelihood and severity of harm from the conduct against the cost to
society of banning the conduct). The breach inquiry concerns whether the actor
behaved reasonably in light of the foreseeable risk.27 Sometimes the breach inquiry
22. See Dobbs, supra note 13, §§ 28-32, at 52-63. See also Maraist&Galligan, supra note 16,
at 27-29.
23. SeeDobbs,Supranote 13, §§ 116-23, at 275-93; Maraist&Galligan,supranote 16, at75-77.
24. The classic example is the rle that mere words do not constitute an assault. Ordinarily this
is true because in most cases words, without some overt act, will not satisfy the operative principle
governing assault, i.e., an act which is substantially certain to cause apprehension of an imminent
harmful or offensive touching to a person of ordinary sensibilities. But one can envision cases in which
words alone are enough, given the particular strengths and susceptibilities of parties (such as "I'm
gonna whip you" told to a child, or, for that matter, to an adult who is trapped in an elevator with the
heavyweight champion).
25. See, e.g.. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 16, at 75-80; Dobbs, supra note 13, § 115, at 270-
71.
26. FoTeseeability-in-fact asks whether a reasonable person, in ordering his or her daily affairs,
would take this risk into consideration. Fer example, a reasonable person may look both ways before
crossing a one-way street (it is likely enough that someone is proceeding in the wrong direction to take
thai into consideration); but, would he or she look skyward (although it is possible that a helicopter
could be landing in the street)? It is important to draw this distinction, because "forseeability" also has
become a legal term of art, used in determining legal causation. See infra Part IV.
27. See supra note 26. One may discern that, depending upon the test applied to determine duty,
the duty and breach inquiries may be duplicative. However, the only important distinction in such a
200
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is expanded to encompass the duty inquiry, such as where a court states that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to drive less than the speed limit in a rainy
school zone shortly after expiration of the special zone speed limit.'s
One might wonder why different courts at different times word differently what
appears to be the same operative principle or why some legal issues are treated at
different levels of analysis, i.e., as part of the general risk or as a specific risk. For
example, the operative principle of the intentional tort of battery may be defined by
a court as "an act substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive touching" or
as "an act substantially certain to cause a touching which is harmful or offensive"
or as "an act substantially certain to cause an unconsented to touching."Sometimes
these differences are merely sloppy lawyering, but in many cases they are deliberate
policy choices. 9
How do courts formulate and, as is frequently necessary, alter, expand or
contract these operative principles? Generally, they do the same thing a legislator
does (or should do) when he or she must vote on legislation: weigh the societal
good that will come from imposing liability upon the actor against the societal harm
that such an imposition may produce. There always is some societal harm from any
imposition of liability upon an actor for any conduct. One such harm is
infringement upon the freedom of that actor to do as he or she pleases, something
which we all would concede is a fundamental American value. Another is proper
allocation ofresources: lawsuits require judges and court reporters and bailiffs and
courthouses and juries; consequently, we worry about allocating too much of our
resources to the judicial resolution of controversies. Yet another evil in imposition
of liability is that it may overdeter desirable conduct; one may be hesitant, for
example, to impose liability upon an actor who botches a rescue, lest future rescuers
would be inclined to look the other way.30 Imposing liability may also compromise
society's desire to encourage people to learn to live together peacefully in a
now-crowded world; thus society may command that its members sometimes bear
"the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."
However, a reasonable person may not be willing to accept some conduct by
others, and if the law does not provide such a reasonable person with a remedy, he
case may be whether the judge or the jury decides the issue. See infra Part VI.
28. See, e.g.. Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co.. 670 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 672
So. 2d 674 (1996); Miller v. Bailey, 621 So. 2d 1174,1184 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d
358 (1993) ("motorists have a duty to drive at a speed reasonable for the conditions of the road, the
weather, the traffic and the time of day").
29. The difference in language between the first and second definitions may produce different
results on the issue of who bears the burden of a reasonable mistake by the actor. The difference
between the second and third definitions may produce a variance in whether the judge orjury decides
the close cases and who bears the burden of persuading the cne who decides. This is so because consent
would be an affinnative defense in the second definition, while lack of consent becomes an element
of plaintiffs cause of action according to the third definition.
30. Indeed, the Louisiana legislature, apparently mindful of a would-be rescuer's temptation to
look the other way out of fear of being held liable for any harm resulting from the rescue, has extended
protection from liability for negligent acts committed by persons who gratuitously render emergency
care. See La. R.S. 9:2793 (1997).
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or she is more likely to retaliate in kind. One must never forget that a major
purpose of the civil law, as with the criminal law, is to keep the peace. Thus if the
conduct is such that a reasonable person cannot be expected to turn the other cheek,
tort law provides a substitute for vengeance by permitting an award of damages to
the victim. This is the deterrent effect of tort law, which, although waning in
importance, still remains a valuable societal policy.
An equally important goal of tort law is compensating the victim. We do not
want to deter all accidents at any cost (if we did, we would ban automobiles,
wouldn't we?). So, assuming that accidents will happen, another goal of tort law
is to spread the accident losses which we allow in a way that will reduce
the societal impact of those losses.3' Here, of course, the best loss spreaders
are governments, liability insurers, and manufacturers of injury-causing
products, and it is not surprising that they are the most common defendants in tort
litigation.
Other societal goals can be fostered by granting or withholding tort remedies.
The classic nineteenth century example was the limited liability of railroads (it
wouldn't make sense to give a company land to build a railroad and then impose
staggering tort liability upon the company for operating the railroad, would it?). In
the twentieth century, tort law was manipulated for such varying reasons as
promoting the opening of private land to recreational use32 and thwarting drug
dealers.33 There are those who hold that the societal policy of tort law in the second
half of the twentieth century was a redistribution of the nation's wealth by allowing
unlimited tort recovery against its deepest pockets.
Another important societal policy fostered by tort law is the satisfaction of the
community's sense ofjustice, i.e., will it seem fair to the man on the street if society
transfers this loss from this victim to this actor?34 Note carefully that the standard
against which the complained of conduct is gauged should be what is considered
to be fair from the perspective of the disinterested man on the street, and not what
is considered fair by the parties, since they make up their minds as to what is fair
before the litigation begins.
31. The law cannot make a loss "go away," but it can reduce the societal impact of the loss by
spreading it among a larger group. Assume, for example, that a fire destroys a law student's apartment
during the first semester of law school. The student now needs $4,000 to purchase the necessities to
continue law school. If, as often would be the case, the student could not come up with the funds
immediately, a law career would be delayed or denied. But would an extra expense of $50 delay or
defeat the pursuit of a law degree? Assuming it would not, if each of the student's classmates chipped
in $50, there would be no interruption of any legal career. The loss would remain, but its destructive
impact upon the quality of human life would be eliminated.
32. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2791,2795 (1997).
33. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2800.61 (Supp. 2000).
34. This societal goal is perhaps the strongest argument for the continuation of the jury system.
Jury systems are costly (both in imposition upon the citizenry and injudicial control). However, serving
on a jury affords the average citizen the opportunity to participate in the governing of fellow citizens,
a worthy goal for a democracy. More importantly, if one wants to determine and implement the
community's sense of justice, is there any better way than to submit the matter to members of the
community selected in an impartial manner and presented with the relevant facts?
2000]
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Accommodating these policies in the allocation of losses through tort law has
led to a judicial recognition of the general risks which, if engaged in by an actor,
would justify transferring the loss fromthe victim to that actor. The actor's conduct
in exposing another to harm from a general risk may be labeled as "fault," 35 such
as where the conduct is intentional or negligent, or may be treated as liability
without fault, such as where vicarious or absolute liability is imposed. As noted
before, if the actor's conduct does not violate a general risk, tort law will not
impose liability, although liability may be imposed on some other basis, or the loss
may be redistributed through some other law, such as Social Security disability
benefits.
IV. THE SPECIFIC RISK
A determination that an actor's conduct falls within the scope of a general risk
does not resolve the inquiry, however. The courts, and the judicial system, then
must turn to the specific risk inquiry, i.e., assuming the actor's conduct exposes
others to an impermissible general risk, do we nevertheless want to impose liability
upon this actor to this victim for these damages occurring in this manner? This
question must be asked to assure that transferring the loss in a particular case will
achieve the best balance of the societal policies that initially led usto proscribe the
general risk and condemn the actor's conduct. The specific risk question could be
asked as one question, but, for a variety of reasons, some of which are purely
historical, it is not. Instead, the judicial system has subdivided the question into
subissues, the most important of which are causation and affirmative defenses.
Part of the "causation specific risk" inquiry is purely factual: did this actor's
conduct have anything to do with this victim's loss? The answer is clearly "yes" if
reasonable minds could conclude from the facts that "but for" the actor's conduct,
the victim would not have suffered the loss. But in many cases (usually involving
multiple actors or the coalescing improper conduct of the actor and the victim) one
cannot comfortably infer causation through the use of the "but for" test.
Nevertheless, where the actor's conduct could have played some part in causing the
victim's harm and the actor's conduct exposed society to a prohibited general risk,
it arguably is better policy (deterrence, loss allocation, fairness, etc.) to impose
some or all of the liability upon that actor. Thus cause-in-fact has been expanded,
for policy reasons, to include policy determinations, including a gradual alteration
of the test for causation from "but for" to an inquiry into whether the actor's
conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the victim's harm.'
35. Because of the Louisiana Civil Code's constraint (Article 2315-liability shall be based upon
"fault"), our courts have been compelled to define as "fault" both the traditional common law fault
(intent and negligence) and the common law liability without fault, i.e., strict liability and absolute
liability. Implementing the third kind of liability without fault, vicarious liability, has required the
courts to tiptoe around the express language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, which provides that
a master is liable for the damage occasioned by a servant only when the master "might have prevented
the act which caused the damage...."
36. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 16, at 86-90.
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The other specific risk questions may be asked at different stages of a torts
analysis, including the general risk level. Take the case of the imprudent victim.
The impact of his or her conduct may defeat recovery at the general risk level or at
the specific risk level. Thus, a victim who voluntarily encounters a potential
batterer may be denied recovery because there was no battery (the act was not
substantially certain to cause a touching which was offensive because of the
consent) or could be denied recovery because of a specific risk inquiry (the victim
consented to the battery, and consent is an affirmative defense defeating tort
recovery). Courts divide on the method of handling some of the specific risk
inquiries.
In negligence, the "this plaintiff" specific risk inquiry may be made at the
general risk duty level, the general risk breach level, or at the specific risk level.
Consider, for example, the imprudent plaintiff who slides down a hill backwards on
a garbage can cover and strikes a parking lot light fixture. If he or she is the last
best avoider of this accident, societal policy may dictate that the loss not be
transferred to the actor (in this case, the person who maintained a parking lot with
concrete light structures) from the victim-slider. Reaching this conclusion, a court
may say one of the following: 1) the actor did not owe a duty, 2) the actor owed
a duty but did not breach it, 3) the actor's conduct was not the legal cause of the
harm, or 4) the victim's recovery is barred by an affirmative defense (assumption
of the risk or contributory negligence). 7
The victim's failure to timely pursue his claim against the actor or his
unwillingness to abide by the judicial result, raises issues ofjudicial efficiency (how
many courts will be needed) and fairness to the actor. These policies are reflected
in specific risk principles that may bar the untimely s or repeated pursuit 9 of the
victim's claim.
The "this defendant" specific risk inquiry also maybe made at the general risk
level, but more frequently it is made at the specific risk level as an affirmative
defense. The most significant bar to recovery considered at the specific risk level
is so-called tort immunity, which absolves the actor from the consequences of all
or part of his conduct toward a victim. The most common type of immunity is
sovereign immunity, which relieves the governmental actor of liability to any
37. At one time, the actor's recovery in such a situation would have been barred by the
affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. The actor also would be contributorily negligent. When
contributory negligence served as a bar to recovery in tort, a distinction between the two affirmative
defenses rarely was made. With the advent of comparative negligence, it has become necessary to
redefine the role of assumption of the risk. The Louisiana Supreme Court has abolished it. See Murray
v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988). Nevertheless, the abolition of one specific risk
category does not resolve the issue of whether the loss should be transferred to the actor from the victim.
That battle is being fought at other levels, such as duty, breach and legal cause. See. e.g., Pitre v.
Louisiana Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).
38. A stale claim maybe barred by the affirmative defense of laches or by a statute of limitations
(in Louisiana, liberative prescription).
39. Repeated litigation of the same issue maybe barred by the doctrines ofresjudicata, collateral
estoppel and law of the case. See, eg., La. R.S. 13:4231 (1991). See also Lejano v. Bandak, 705 So.
2d 158 (La. 1997).
2000]
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person for certain activities which violate a general risk proscription and cause loss
to a victim. Other immunities encompass both "this plaintiff' and "this defendant,"
such as the family and workplace immunities.
Both at common law and in Louisiana the "these damages" specific risk inquiry
frequently is made at the duty level. The answer to this inquiry may be that one
does not owe a duty to protect against harm to an unforeseeable plaintiff, or that one
does not owe a duty to protect against causing mental anguish unaccompanied by
contemporaneous physical injury, or that one does not owe a duty to guard against
a family member's loss of society with a trauma victim. The "these damages"
inquiry also may be made at the causation level, a fact that has perplexed students
of the law at every level. Treating the issue at the causation level has led to the
development of two separate causation elements--causation-in-fact, discussed
above, and legal or proximate cause. Thus, ajurisdiction which determines that the
better balance of societal policies (overdeterrence, fairness, interference with
contract law, etc.) dictates that a victim should not recover economic loss unless his
person or his tangible property is damaged, may express that conclusion in terms
of "no duty" to protect against certain economic harm, or may conclude that the
defendant's breach of his duty was not the "legal cause" of the economic harm. In
either case, the outcome for the litigants is the same. Not so for the judicial
system, as law students and lawyers struggle to comprehend why sometimes
there is no duty and sometimes there is no legal or proximate cause. This "limited
duty," "duty/risk" and proximate or legal cause inquiry is the favorite of law
professors,' probably because it affords the best opportunity to confound law
students.4
Perhaps the easiest of all the specific risk inquiries to categorize is the "this
manner" risk, i.e., do we want to impose liability for damages occurring in a
particular manner? When the inquiry reaches this level, the major societal policy
at play is fairness, although arguably there is a deterrence/overdeterrence
consideration in many of these cases. It is here that foreseeability-in-fact plays
another important role. There is a compelling logic to the argument that if we
require members of society to act reasonably in the light of the harm they can
foresee, it is fundamentally unfair to hold them liable for damage occurring in a
manner which they could not foresee. Dissatisfaction with this potential for
unfairness has led to the emerging rule that the scope of the risks for negligent
conduct is limited to the damages that the actor in fact could have foreseen when
he acted. However, there are at least two problems with this conclusion. One is the
fairness argument. What if the actor could not foresee the manner in which his or
her conduct would cause damage, but if he had acted to avoid the harm that he
could have foreseen, it also would have avoided the unforeseeable harm that
occurred? Fairness, then, seems to point toward imposing liability upon the actor
40. The "love affair" between law professors and proximate cause is evidenced by the length of
the chapters on that subject in Torts casebooks.
41. As Professor Bill Corbett, one of my Torts colleagues, so aptlyputs it, "using proximate cause
to baffle students is like hunting deer with a machine gun."
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for the unforeseeable harm, particularly where the victim's conduct was not
improper. The second problem is that societal policy may dictate a limitation on
damages that are foreseeable-in-fact, such as when a railroad engine starts a fire
which spreads over a large area and causes catastrophic damages. What if, as in the
nineteenth century, the societal policy was to limit the damages for which a railroad
was responsible although such damages were foreseeable-in-fact when the actor
(the railroad) acted? If the test in the particular jurisdiction for the scope of the
risks was foreseeability, a court, in denying recovery beyond the first building,
could state confidently that the burning of the second building was "not
foreseeable."In such a case, foreseeability becomes a term of art. Although the
result may be acceptable as a matter of societal policy, it leaves in its wake
generations of law students and lawyers who are puzzled by the concept of
foreseeability.
V. THE BOTTOM LINE
The "bottom line" is that in every case in which an actor's conduct causes harm
to another (the victim) and in which there is no statute or valid contractual
agreement which determines where the loss should fall, the judicial system,
applying "tort law," must decide whether the loss should be transferred from the
victim to the actor or should stay with the victim. This determination should be
made by balancing the competing societal policies (values, if you will). The
balancing cannot be made de novo in the resolution of every dispute that sounds in
tort; such a result would undercut one or more of the relevant policies. Without
established rules, one could not predict with reasonable accuracy whether certain
conduct will trigger the imposition of liability for any damage caused. Without
some degree of predictability, there would be either over-deterrence or a loss of
deterrence, an inability to properly spread the unavoidable losses through insurance,
and, most importantly, society probably would perceive that "the law is an
ass."Thus, more precise guidelines have been developed by the lawmaker (which,
in tort law, is primarily the jurist). Those guidelines take the shape of general risks
which, if not avoided, can lead to the imposition of liability. Where the actor does
not avoid the general risk, tort laws makes a second inquiry into whether the better
balance of societal policies dictates that a particular loss to a particular victim
occurring in a particular manner should be transferred from this victim to this actor.
All of this has led to operative principles such as battery, negligence, legal cause,
immunity and contributory negligence. These principles, when applied to the
myriad fact patterns that emerge in a crowded society, may evolve into hard and
fast rules of liability or no liability. The result is a "rule," such as one which
provides that the driver of a rear-ending automobile is presumed negligent vis-a-vis
the driver of the preceding vehicle. Students of the law must constantly be
cognizant of the three "levels" of law-the competing societal values, the operative
principles that spring from a balancing of those policies, and the rules that develop
from the application of an operative principle to a frequently recurring factual
scenario. The lawyer should know the operative principles and the rules, but should
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be ever mindful of their origin as a perceived proper balance of competing societal
values. And the lawyer should appreciate that as society changes, its values change,
and that there eventually will be a concomitant change in the tort rule or the tort
principle or both.
VI. THE RoLEs OF JUDGE AND JURY IN THE PROCESS
There is one other issue which dominates tort law as we enter the twenty-first
century: who will make the choice between competing societal policies? In a
society which reveres the jury system, jurors must play some role. But a case by
case determination (which is the only thing a jury can produce) is antithetical to the
predictability ofresults that tort law often demands. Thus, another battleground for
tort principles is the role the jury should play in resolving a tort case.
Generally, juries are as capable at fact-finding as are judges, particularly where
trained legal minds (opposing counsel) present the evidence. Thus where trial is by
jury, the jurors are adequate for the task of determining questions of pure fact,
although they sometimes may need the opinions of others more qualified, i.e.,
expert witnesses. However, jurors cannot determine what will be the applicable
principles and rules of law in the case, as the very nature of this inquiry requires
consistency of result and a broad knowledge of law. Thus judges determine
questions of law. But what about the third level of abstraction in the law process:
the application of the facts to the law? If a person fails to act in a reasonably
prudent manner under the circumstances, he or she is negligent. This is a pure law
question, established by the jurisprudence and not subject to change except by the
legislature or the jurisprudence. Whether a particular defendant was driving 35
miles per hour in a school zone at 3:15 p.m. while rushing a bleeding hemophiliac
to a hospital is a pure fact question, and a jury of lay persons is adequate for this
fact-finding task. But the application of pure fact to pure law, i.e., whether a
particular defendant's conduct under particular circumstances is unreasonable
(negligent), is a mixed question of law and fact, since the answer requires the
application of the facts to the rule of law. In the American legal system, this mixed
question, though generally assigned to the jury, is subject to judicial oversight,
meaning that if the judge determines that reasonable minds could only reach one
conclusion by applying these facts to this law, then there is either negligence or no
negligence as a matter of law, and the decision is taken from the jury.42
Our respect for the jury system perhaps has led us to give juries too much to do
at too great a societal cost. For example, determining some mixed questions (such
as whether a product is unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances or whether
an activity should be subject to absolute liability) may involve an understanding and
require an application of societal policies which are beyond the ken of the average
42. This generally is done at the trial level by means of a directed verdict or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (a 'Judgment as a matter of law" in federal court). It also may be done by
the judge prior to trial if there is no dispute as to the facts (sunaryjudgment), or if the facts, if proved,
would not "trigger" the application of the rule of law (demurrer or no cause of action).
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juror. Nevertheless, we have given those issue to juries, despite the claim of some
who say that jury determinations of these issues have led to a tort "crisis" and the
resulting tort reform that pervaded the last third of the twentieth century. Certainly,
it has generated a procedural "sub-culture" in which expert testimony is essential
and courts are forced to screen jurors from the "flakes" who saturate the system.43
An argument can be made that juries should be allowed to resolve tort claims only
in those cases in which the dominant issue is fundamental fairness between the
parties, i.e., what does the community's sense ofjustice dictate should be done with
this particular loss? Such cases generally can be identified as those in which other
societal policies are less important because the decision to impose liability will not
have far-reaching implications.
VII. SUMMATION
This rambling writing perhaps proves that the legend's comment was somewhat
accurate: the general outline of tort law can be written on the back of an envelope,
as can the general outline of contract law. But like contract law, tort law devolves
into thousands of rules which are applied to specific factual situations by a judge
or jury. The law student seeking to comprehend the law and the lawyer and judge
seeking to apply it, should be eternally cognizant of the general outline--what is the
general risk involved, and what specific risks are implicated? He or she also should
be eternally cognizant that the general risk and specific risk principles which they
learn and apply merely represent a certain balance of certain competing societal
policies at a certain time. As times change, society's values change, and the lawyer
and judge (and perhaps the law student, particularly on that final examination) must
always ask whether the better balance of societal policies at this time under these
circumstances dictates that the principle and, where appropriate, the particular rule,
should endure and apply.
VIII. THE FUTURE
What changes in society and its values will have the heaviest impact upon tort
law in the twenty-first century? Certainly the decline in the "nuclear family" and
the growing acceptance of some substitutes, such as concubinage and
homosexuality, will impact some of the "specific risks" in the analysis of tort law.
One also may predict an impact from other changes, such as (to name a few) genetic
engineering, advances in health services, the widening of the gap between the well
educated and the poorly educated, the increase in the elderly population, and
society's desire to use civil law to protect the economically powerless. The general
risks play the major role in the use of tort law to redistribute wealth; thus, one may
expect an alteration in such risks, depending upon the legislative and judicial
43. Thus a trial judge must exercise his or her "gatekeeping" function to prevent a jury from
hearing expert testimony which is unreliable. See, e.g., Frank L. Maraist, Evidence and Proof § 11.3,
at 196-204, in 19 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1999).
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philosophies which prevail at a given time. The general risks also may be altered
to accommodate the globalization of the American economy.
There are three societal changes which threaten the viability of the "general
risk/specific risk" tort analysis. One is the continuing growth of "big government,"
whose presence already has been felt in the large number of special statutes
governing tort liability. A second is the breakdown in the homogeneity of the
American society, a breakdown which has forced the legal system to referee
disputes which formerly were resolved by peer pressure or community values. The
third is the escalating cost of administering an adversarial torts system. Alternate
procedural measures, such as arbitration and mediation, may be successful in
reducing the cost to society of dispute resolution. Regardless, legislatures now
engaged in "micromanaging" tort law may move toward a system of absolute
liability for limited damages, administered through a government agency. However,
unless such a system becomes a pure governmental dole, it will be required to
delineate the general and specific circumstances in which the "victim" will be
compensated. Thus the two basic questions will remain, and the legend's twentieth
century observation will survive the dawning of the new millennium.
